Abstract. A shallow semantic embedding of an intensional higher-order modal logic (IHOML) in Isabelle/HOL is presented. IHOML draws on Montague/Gallin intensional logics and has been introduced by Melvin Fitting in his textbook Types, Tableaus and Gödel's God in order to discuss his emendation of Gödel's ontological argument for the existence of God. Utilizing IHOML, the most interesting parts of Fitting's textbook are formalized, automated and verified in the Isabelle/HOL proof assistant. A particular focus thereby is on three variants of the ontological argument which avoid the modal collapse, which is a strongly criticized side-e↵ect in Gödel's resp. Scott's original work.
Introduction
The first part of this paper introduces a shallow semantic embedding of an intensional higher-order modal logic (IHOML) in classical higher-order logic (Isabelle/HOL 3 ). IHOML, as introduced by Fitting [15] , is a modification of the intensional logic originally developed by Montague and later expanded by Gallin [18] by building upon Church's type theory and Kripke's possible-world semantics. Our approach builds on previous work on the semantic embedding of multimodal logics with quantification [6] , which we expand here to allow for actualist quantification, intensional terms and their related operations. From an AI perspective we contribute a highly flexible framework for automated reasoning in intensional and modal logic. IHOML, which has not been automated before, has several applications, e.g. towards the deep semantic analysis of natural language rational arguments as envisioned in the new DFG Schwerpunktprogramm RATIO (SPP 1999).
In the second part, we present an exemplary, non-trivial application of this reasoning infrastructure: A study on computational metaphysics 4 , the computerformalization and critical assessment of Gödel's [19] (resp. Dana Scott's [25] ) modern variant of the ontological argument and two of its proposed emendations as discussed in [15] . Gödel's ontological argument is amongst the most discussed formal proofs in modern literature. Several authors (e.g. [3, 2, 11, 20, 15] ) have proposed emendations with the aim of retaining its essential result (the necessary existence of God) while at the same time avoiding the modal collapse (whatever is the case is so necessarily) [26, 27] . The modal collapse is an undesirable side-e↵ect of the axioms postulated by Gödel (resp. Scott). It essentially states that there are no contingent truths and everything is determined.
Related work
5 has formalized several of these variants on the computer and verified or falsified them. For example, Gödel's axiom's system has been shown inconsistent [9, 10] , while Scott's version has been verified [8] . Further experiments, contributing amongst others to the clarification of a related debate regarding the redundancy of some axioms in Anderson's emendation, are presented and discussed in [7] . The enabling technique in these case studies has been shallow semantic embeddings of extensional higher-order modal logics in classical higher-order logic (see [6, 4] and the references therein).
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In contrast to the related work, Fitting's variant is based on intensional higherorder modal logic. Our experiments confirm that Fitting's argument, as presented in his textbook [15] , is valid and that it avoids the modal collapse as intended. Due to lack of space, we refer the reader to our (computer-verified) paper [17] for further results. That paper has been written directly in the Isabelle/HOL proof assistant and requires some familiarity with this system and with Fitting's textbook.
The work presented here originates from the Computational Metaphysics lecture course held at the FU Berlin in Summer 2016 [28] .
Embedding of Intensional Higher-Order Modal Logic

Type Declarations
Since IHOML and Isabelle/HOL are both typed languages, we introduce a typemapping between them. We follow as closely as possible the syntax given by Fitting ([15] p. 86), according to which, for any extensional type ⌧ , "⌧ becomes its corresponding intensional type. For instance, a set of (red) objects has the extensional type hei, whereas the concept 'red' has intensional type "hei.
typedecl e -type for entities typedecl w -type for possible worlds type-synonym wo = (w )bool ) -type for world-dependent formulas
Aliases for some common complex types (predicates and relations).
type-synonym ie=(w )e) ("e) -individual concepts (map worlds to objects) type-synonym se=(e)bool ) (hei) -(extensional) sets type-synonym ise=(e)wo) ("hei) -(intensional predicative) concepts type-synonym sise=("hei)bool ) (h"heii) -sets of concepts type-synonym isise=("hei)wo) ("h"heii) -2-order concepts type-synonym see=(e)e)bool ) (he,ei) -(extensional) relations type-synonym isee=(e)e)wo) ("he,ei) -(intensional) relational concepts
Logical Constants as Truth-Sets
We embed modal operators as sets of worlds satisfying a corresponding formula.
Possibilist quantifiers are embedded as follows. The actualizedAt predicate is used to additionally embed actualist quantifiers by restricting the domain of quantification at every possible world. This standard technique has been referred to as existence relativization ( [16] , p. 106), highlighting the fact that this predicate can be seen as a kind of meta-logical 'existence predicate' telling us which individuals actually exist at a given world. This meta-logical concept does not appear in our object language. Frame's accessibility relation and modal operators.
7 Possibilist and actualist quantification can be seen as the semantic counterparts of the concepts of possibilism and actualism in the metaphysics of modality. They relate to natural-language expressions such as 'there is', 'exists', 'is actual', etc. where x ⇡ y ⌘ w . x = y abbreviation meqC :: "h"e,"ei (infix ⇡ C ) -equality for individual concepts
Extension-of Operator
According to Fitting's semantics ( [15] , pp. 92-4), # is an unary operator applying only to intensional terms. A term of the form #↵ designates the extension of the intensional object designated by ↵, at some given world. For instance, suppose we take possible worlds as persons, we can therefore think of the concept 'red' as a function that maps each person to the set of objects that person classifies as red (its extension). We can further state that the intensional term r of type "hei designates the concept 'red'. As can be seen, intensional terms in IHOML designate functions on possible worlds and they always do it rigidly. We will sometimes refer to an intensional object explicitly as 'rigid', implying that its (rigidly) designated function has the same extension in all possible worlds.
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Terms of the form #↵ are called relativized (extensional) terms; they are always derived from intensional terms and their type is extensional (in the color example #r would be of type hei). Relativized terms may vary their denotation from world to world of a model, because the extension of an intensional term can change from world to world, i.e. they are non-rigid.
In our Isabelle/HOL embedding, we had to follow a slightly di↵erent approach; we model # as a predicate applying to formulas of the form (#↵ 1 ,. . .↵ n ). For instance, the formula Q(#a 1 ) w (evaluated at world w ) is modeled as ⇡(Q,a 1 ) w , or (Q ⇡ a 1 ) w using infix notation, which gets further translated into Q(a 1 (w )) w .
(a) Predicate ' takes as argument a relativized term derived from an (intensional) individual concept of type "e.
abbreviation extIndArg::"hei)"e)wo (infix ⇡) where ' ⇡c ⌘ w . ' (c w) w (b) A variant of (a) for terms derived from predicates (types of form "hti).
where ' #P ⌘ w . ' ( x . P x w) w 8 The notion of rigid designation was introduced by Kripke in [21] , where he discusses its many interesting ramifications in logic and the philosophy of language.
Verifying the Embedding
The above definitions introduce modal logic K with possibilist and actualist quantifiers, as evidenced by the following tests.
Local consequence implies global consequence (not the other way round).
(Converse-)Barcan formulas are satisfied for possibilist, but not for actualist, quantification.
-redex is valid for non-relativized (intensional or extensional) terms.
-redex is valid for relativized terms as long as no modal operators occur.
Modal collapse is countersatisfiable. Intensional terms are trivially rigid. This predicate tests whether an intensional predicate is 'rigid' in the sense of denoting a world-independent function.
We prove theorems in Isabelle by using the keyword 'by' followed by the name of a proof method. Some methods used here are: simp (term rewriting), blast (tableaus), meson (model elimination), metis (ordered resolution and paramodulation), auto (classical reasoning and term rewriting) and force (exhaustive search trying di↵erent tools). In our computer-formalization and assessment of Fitting's textbook [17] , we provide further evidence that our embedded logic works as intended by verifying the book's theorems and examples. 10 We utilize here (counter-)model finder Nitpick [12] for the first time. For the conjectured lemma, Nitpick finds a countermodel (not shown here), i.e. a model satisfying all the axioms which falsifies the given formula. 
We prove them equivalent in S5 logic (using Sahlqvist correspondence).
lemma equivalence aRel =) bstabilityA (⌧ ::"hei)c ! bstabilityB ⌧ c by blast lemma equivalence aRel =) bstabilityB (⌧ ::"hei)c ! bstabilityA ⌧ c by blast A term is 'rigid' if and only if it satisfies the stability conditions.
De re is equivalent to de dicto for non-relativized terms.
De re is not equivalent to de dicto for relativized terms.
Useful Definitions for the Axiomatization of Further Logics
The best-known normal logics (K4, K5, KB, K45, KB5, D, D4, D5, D45, ...) can be obtained by combinations of the following axioms:
Instead of postulating combinations of the above axioms we make use of the wellknown Sahlqvist correspondence, which links axioms to constraints on a model's accessibility relation. We show that reflexivity, symmetry, seriality, transitivity and euclideanness imply axioms T, B, D, IV, V respectively.
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lemma reflexive aRel =) bT c by blast lemma symmetric aRel =) bB c by blast lemma serial aRel =) bDc by blast lemma transitive aRel =) bIV c by blast lemma euclidean aRel =) bV c by blast lemma preorder aRel =) bT c^bIV c by blast -S4: reflexive + transitive lemma equivalence aRel =) bT c^bV c by blast -S5: preorder + symmetric 11 The de dicto/de re distinction is used regularly in the philosophy of language for disambiguation of sentences involving intensional contexts. 12 Implication can also be proven in the reverse direction (which is not needed for our purposes). Using these definitions, we can derive axioms for the most common modal logics (see also [5] ). Thereby we are free to use either the semantic constraints or the related Sahlqvist axioms. Here we provide both versions. In what follows we use the semantic constraints for improved performance.
Gödel's Ontological Argument
Part I -God's Existence is Possible
Gödel's particular version of the argument is a direct descendant of that of Leibniz, which in turn derives from one of Descartes. His argument relies on proving (T1) 'Positive properties are possibly instantiated', which together with (T2) 'God is a positive property' directly implies the conclusion. In order to prove T1, Gödel assumes (A2) 'Any property entailed by a positive property is positive'. As we will see, the success of this argumentation depends on how we formalize our notion of entailment.
abbreviation Entails::"h"hei,"heii (infixV) where
The definition of property entailment introduced by Gödel can be criticized on the grounds that it lacks some notion of relevance and is therefore exposed to the paradoxes of material implication. In particular, when we assert that property A does not entail property B, we implicitly assume that A is possibly instantiated. Conversely, an impossible property (like being a round square) entails any property (like being a triangle). It is precisely by virtue of these paradoxes that Gödel manages to prove T1.
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consts Positiveness::"h"heii (P) -positiveness applies to intensional predicates abbreviation Existence::"hei (E !) -object-language existence predicate where
Gödel's axioms for the first part essentially say that (A1) either a property or its negation must be positive, (A2) positive properties are closed under entailment and (A3) also closed under conjunction.
abbreviation appliesToPositiveProps::"h"h"heiii (pos) where pos Z ⌘ 8 X . Z X ! P X abbreviation intersectionOf ::"h"hei,"h"heiii (intersec) where
axiomatization where A1a: b8 X . P (+X ) ! ¬(P X ) c and A1b: b8 X . ¬(P X ) ! P (+X )c and
lemma True nitpick[satisfy] oops -model found: axioms are consistent lemma bDc using A1a A1b A2 by blast -D axiom is implicitely assumed
Positive properties are possibly instantiated. 13 To prove T1, the fact is used that positive properties cannot entail negative ones (A2), from which the possible instantiation of positive properties follows. A computer-formalization of Leibniz's theory of concepts can be found in [1] , where the notion of concept containment in contrast to ordinary property entailment is discussed.
theorem T1 : b8 X . P X ! ⌃9 A X c using A1a A2 by blast
Being Godlike is defined as having all (and only) positive properties.
lemma GodDefsAreEquivalent: b8 x . G x $ G⇤ x c using A1b by force
While Leibniz provides an informal proof for the compatibility of all perfections, Gödel postulates this as A3 (the conjunction of any collection of positive properties is positive), which is a third-order axiom. As shown below, the only use of A3 is to prove that being Godlike is positive (T2 ). Dana Scott, apparently noting this, proposed taking it directly as an axiom (see [15] , p. 152).
14 theorem T2 : bP Gc proof { fix w have 1 : ((pos P)^(intersec G P)) w by simp have (8 Z X . (pos Z^intersec X Z ) ! P X ) w using A3 by (rule allE ) hence (((pos P)^(intersec G P)) ! P G) w using allE by (rule allE ) hence ((pos P^intersec G P) w ) ! P G w by simp hence P G w using 1 by (rule mp) } thus ?thesis by (rule allI ) qed Conclusion for the first part: Possibly God exists.
A Gc using T1 T2 by simp
Part II -God's Existence is Necessary, if Possible
We show here that some additional (philosophically controversial) assumptions are needed to prove the argument's conclusion, including an essentialist premise and the S5 axioms. (Gödel's resp. Scott's original version works in extensional HOML already for modal logic B [8, 9] ). Further derived results like monotheism and absence of free will are also discussed.
axiomatization where A4a: b8 X . P X ! ⇤(P X )c
A4b was originally assumed by Gödel as an axiom. We can now prove it.
lemma A4b: b8 X . ¬(P X ) ! ⇤¬(P X )c using A1a A1b A4a by blast lemma True nitpick[satisfy] oops -model found: all axioms A1-4 consistent Axiom A4a and its consequence A4b together imply that P satisfies Fitting's stability conditions ( [15] , p. 124). This means P designates rigidly. Note that this makes for an essentialist assumption which may be considered controversial by some philosophers: every property considered positive in our world (e.g. honesty) is necessarily so. Being Godlike is an essential property.
lemma GodIsEssential : b8 x . G x ! (E G x)c using A1b A4a by metis
Something can have only one essence.
An essential property o↵ers a complete characterization of an individual.
lemma EssencesCharacterizeCompletely: b8 X y. E X y ! (X V (id y))c proof (rule ccontr ) -Isar proof by contradiction not shown here
Gödel introduces a particular notion of necessary existence as the property something has, provided any essence of it is necessarily instantiated.
axiomatization where A5 : bP NE c -necessary existence is a positive property lemma True nitpick[satisfy] oops -model found: so far all axioms consistent (Possibilist) existence of God implies its necessary (actualist) existence.
We postulate the S5 axioms (via Sahlqvist correspondence) separately, in order to get more detailed information about their relevance in the proofs below. Possible existence of God implies its necessary (actualist) existence (note that we only rely on axioms B and IV ).
theorem T5 : b⌃9 Gc ! b⇤9 A Gc proof -not shown theorem GodExistsNecessarily: b⇤9 A Gc using T3 T5 by metis lemma GodExistenceIsValid : b9 A Gc using GodExistsNecessarily ax-T by auto
Monotheism for non-normal models (using Leibniz equality) follows directly from God having all and only positive properties, but the proof for normal models is trickier. We need to consider previous results ( [15] , p. 162).
Fitting [15] also discusses the objection raised by Sobel [27] , who argues that Gödel's axiom system is too strong since it implies that whatever is the case is so necessarily: the modal system collapses. In the context of our S5 axioms, we can formalize Sobel's argument and prove modal collapse valid ( [15] , pp. 163-4).
have 9 x . G x w using GodExistenceIsValid by auto
In this section we consider Fitting's solution to the objections raised in his discussion of Gödel's Argument ( [15] , pp. 164-9), especially the problem of modal collapse, which has been metaphysically interpreted as implying a rejection of free will. In Gödel's variant, positiveness and essence were thought of as predicates applying to intensional properties and correspondingly formalized using intensional types for their arguments ("h"heii and "h"hei,ei respectively). In this variant, Fitting chooses to reformulate these definitions using extensional types ("hheii and "hhei,ei) instead, and makes the corresponding adjustments to the rest of the argument (to ensure type correctness). This has some philosophical repercussions; e.g. while we could say before that honesty (as concept) was a positive property, now we can only talk of its extension at some world and say of some group of people that they are honest (necessarily honest, in fact, because P has also been proven 'rigid' in this variant).
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consts Positiveness::"hheii (P) abbreviation Entails::"hhei,heii (infixV) where
Axioms and theorems remain essentially the same. Particularly (T2) bP #Gc and (A5) bP #NE c work with relativized extensional terms now.
theorem T1 : b8 X ::hei. P X ! ⌃(9 A z . (|X z|))c using A1a A2 by blast theorem T3deRe: b( X . ⌃9 A X ) #Gc using T1 T2 by simp lemma GodIsEssential : b8 x . G x ! ((E #1G) x )c using A1b by metis
The following theorem could be formalized in two variants 17 (drawing on the de re/de dicto distinction). We prove both of them valid and show how the argument splits, culminating in two non-equivalent versions of the conclusion, both of which are proven valid.
In contrast to Gödel's version (as presented by Fitting), the following theorems can be proven in logic K (the S5 axioms are no longer needed).
lemma T5v1 :b⌃9 #Gc !b⇤9 A #Gc using T4v1 T3deRe by metis
Necessary Existence of God (de dicto and de re readings).
lemma GodNecExists-deDicto: b⇤9 A #Gc using T3deRe T4v1 by blast lemma GodNecExists-deRe: b( X . ⇤9 A X ) #Gc using T3deRe T5v2 by blast
Modal collapse is countersatisfiable even in S5. Note that countermodels with a cardinality of one for the domain of individuals are found by Nitpick (the countermodel shown in Fitting's book has cardinality of two).
In this section, we verify Anderson's emendation of Gödel's argument [3] , as presented by Fitting ([15] , pp. 169-171). In the previous variants there were no 'indi↵erent' properties, either a property or its negation had to be positive. Anderson makes room for 'indi↵erent' properties by dropping axiom A1b (b8 X . ¬(P X ) ! P (+X )c). As a consequence, he changes the following definitions to ensure argument's validity.
There is now the requirement that a Godlike being must have positive properties necessarily. For the definition of essence, Scott's addition [25] , that the essence of an object actually applies to the object, is dropped. A necessity operator has been introduced instead.
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The rest of the argument is essentially similar to Gödel's (also in S5 logic).
theorem T1 : b8 X . P X ! ⌃9 A X c using A1a A2 by blast theorem T3 : b⌃9 A Gc using T1 T2 by simp If g is Godlike, the property of being Godlike is its essence.
The necessary existence of God follows from its possible existence.
theorem T5 : b⌃9 Gc ! b⇤9 A Gc proof -not shown
The conclusion could be proven (with one fewer axiom, though more complex definitions) and Nitpick is able to find a countermodel for the modal collapse.
lemma GodExistsNecessarily: b⇤9 A Gc using T3 T5 by metis lemma ModalCollapse: b8 . ! ⇤ c nitpick oops -countersatisfiable
Conclusion
We presented a shallow semantic embedding in Isabelle/HOL for an intensional higher-order modal logic (a successor of Montague/Gallin intensional logics) and employed this logic to formalize and verify three di↵erent variants of the ontological argument: the first one by Gödel himself (resp. Scott), the second one by Fitting and the last one by Anderson.
By employing our embedding of IHOML in Isabelle/HOL, we could not only verify Fitting's results, but also guarantee consistency of axioms. Moreover, for many theorems we could prove stronger versions and find better countermodels (i.e. with smaller cardinality) than the ones presented by Fitting. Another interesting aspect was the possibility to explore the implications of alternative formalizations of axioms and theorems which shed light on interesting philosophical issues concerning entailment, essentialism and free will.
The latest developments in automated theorem proving, in combination with the embedding approach, allow us to engage in much better experimentation during the formalization and assessment of arguments than ever before. The potential reduction (of several orders of magnitude) in the time needed for proving or disproving theorems (compared to pen-and-paper proofs), results in almost realtime feedback about the suitability of our speculations. The practical benefits of computer-supported argumentation go beyond mere quantitative aspects (easier, faster and more reliable proofs). The advantages are also qualitative, since a significantly di↵erent approach to argumentation is fostered: We can now work iteratively (by trial-and-error) on an argument by making gradual adjustments to its definitions, axioms and theorems. This allows us to continuously expose and revise the assumptions we indirectly commit ourselves to every time we opt for some particular formalization.
